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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public
firms objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distor-
tionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the
impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the
timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot)
versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of
competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a
private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from
the shift in public firm’s objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may
be preferred.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades of the XX century a process of liberalization and/or privatization occurred
in most of the industrialized countries and, since then, public utilities are generally no longer
provided by public monopolies. The motivations for this program were essentially linked to
the general perception of poor performance of public monopolies and to the idea that entry of
private subjects could enhance efficiency. For example, during the nineties, in Italy, in France
and in UK, as in many EU countries, the public incumbent faced the entry of private com-
petitors in many communication services. The same occurred in the production of electricity,
in gas retailing and more recently in some postal services. In the same years, national (public)
airlines started competing with private or foreign ones in the domestic markets. Moreover,
examples of public monopolies that became mixed oligopoly can be found in a broad range
of industries including railways, steel and overnight-delivery industries, as well as services
including banking, home loans, health care, life insurance, hospitals, broadcasting, and edu-
cation.1 In these cases, instead of regulating a privatized monopoly, governments decided to
enforce a facility-based competitions in order to achieve a so-called dynamic efficiency.2 In
other cases, even if public firms had not been privatized, it was required its management to
operate satisfying the budget balance constraint or to directly maximize profits, as private
firms do.
Our investigation starts downward the liberalization process of a public monopoly, and
the aim of the present work is to build a theoretical model for analyzing the welfare effect
of a change in its objective function in oligopoly3. Since we mainly refer to public utility
markets open to competition, we consider a mixed duopoly in which firms are characterized
by increasing returns to scale (with fixed and constant marginal costs) and we assume that
the public firm is typically less efficient than its private competitor.4
The first novel contribution of this paper is represented by the introduction of the shadow
cost of public funds in the public firm’s objective function. That is, we assume that the
public firm is required to take into account the distortionary effect of the taxes that are
needed to cover its deficit and, in general, public expenditures. In fact, absent lump-sum tax
instruments, if government rises 1 Euro from taxation, society pays (1 + λ) Euros. Coherently,
public profits, when positive, avoid an equivalent public transfer, reducing distortionary taxes.5
As initially analyzed in Meade (1944) and exploited in Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993), this
approach has been used to characterize public monopolies running a deficit and, more generally,
regulated markets. Here we apply the same analysis to a public firm competing in a duopoly
and to the effects of privatization or of a change f public firm’ objective function like profit
1In industrial organization the term mixed oligopolies has been used to describe imperfectly competitive
markets in which public firms compete with private ones.
2For deeper viewpoints on the role played by facility-based competition in EU and US Telecommunications
liberalization and regulation processes see Taschdjian (1997) and Stehmann and Borthwick (1994).
3This change can be the consequence not only of a privatization process but also of a political choice.
4Differently from Cremer et al. (1989), the public firm’s higher cost is not a neutral transfer from firm to
workers belonging to the same economy but, as an X−inefficiency, it reduces any utilitarian measure of welfare.
Moreover, we can represent with an extra cost any problem of controlling and/or monitoring that derive from
agency problem that affect public firms but that we don’t analyze. Notice that we do not consider that in any
context public firms are less efficient than private competitors, but we start from the worst context and we
prove that inefficiency cannot matter.
5Since public firm’s profit or deficit are not a neutral transfer among agents of the same economy, they ought
not to be weighted as private firm’s profits or consumer net surplus in the utilitarian measure of welfare, but
they should be weighted (1 + λ).
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maximization, given that getting money for reducing public debt or distortionary taxes, is often
a complementary target6. The main consequence is that, taking into account the shadow cost
of public funds, the public firm puts more weight on its own profits mimicking, at least
partially, the behaviour of a private firm.
The second contribution of this work is that we consider the effect of a change in the public
firm’s objective function on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of
simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. That is, the structure of
the game is not assumed a priori, but is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous
decisions by the players. In fact, in many economic situations it is often more reasonable to
assume that firms choose not only what action to take, but also when to take it. Moreover,
we believe that this approach is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that
results and policy prescriptions emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competi-
tion assumed. For example, in de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is shown that privatization may
improve welfare under Cournot competition even without efficiency gains; while, if a Stack-
elberg game with public leadership is exogenously assumed, this cannot occur.7 In another
paper, Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) show that welfare may be higher when the public firm is
the follower than when it is the leader in a Stackelberg game. In this way they provided an
argument against the standard view of the so-called Second-Best literature (see, for example,
Rees, 1984; Bo¨s, 1986) that claimed the sub-optimality of the marginal-cost pricing rule.8
In the present work, in order to endogenize the timing of the game, we apply the model de-
veloped by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to the mixed oligopoly framework. In their insightful
paper, the authors build an endogenous timing game by adding to the basic quantity game
a preplay stage at which players simultaneously and independently decide whether to move
early or late in the basic game. Therefore, the type of competition endogenously emerges in
the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this extended game. Amir and Grilo (1999) apply
this model to a private duopoly showing that, in a quantity setting with strategic substi-
tutability, Cournot equilibria always result as the SPE of the endogenous timing game. Pal
(1998) addresses the issue of endogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly by adopting the
same game structure. It is shown that sequential playing always emerges as the endogenous
timing and both Stackelberg solutions are the SPE of the mixed-duopoly game. Even though
after Pal (1998) other authors analyzed the endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies, there is
no work, at our best knowledge, that extends this line of research to the welfare evaluation of
privatization.9
The main results of our analysis can be summed up as follows.
With respect to the determination of the endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, our results
differ from Pal (1998), since in our model setting either Nash, or private leadership or both
Stackelberg outcomes can result as subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the endogenous timing
game. Moreover, following the intuition of Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), we show that when
both Stackelberg game are SPE of the endogenous timing game, private leadership is preferred
6Given our model setting, it will be clear than there is no differences between to privatize a public firm and
to ask its management to maximize no welfare but profits. This case is what we call a change in the public
firm’s objective function.
7The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is fundamental to their result that privatization may increases
welfare. This is generally not the case of a public utility provider.
8See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey of these models.
9Matsumura (2003), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003) and Sepahvand (2004) apply the same model to interna-
tional mixed oligopolies finding that public leadership may emerge as the unique SPE of the endogenous timing
game.
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by the public firm and it is indeed selected when risk-dominance is used as the equilibrium
selection criterion.
This result is crucial to the evaluation of the welfare impact of asking a public firm to
maximize profits. In fact, differently from de Fraja and Delbono (1989), absent efficiency
gains, profit maximization never increases welfare. Furthermore, even when large efficiency
gains are realized, an inefficient public firm that maximize welfare may still be preferred. The
last result relies on the fact that only with a public firm sequential outcomes (that are always
welfare superior) may be supported as SPE of the endogenous timing game. Conversely, with
private-owned firms, simultaneous equilibria are always implemented.
It is worth noting that our results are obtained in a context of complete information,
and under the assumption that government has the full bargaining power in the privatization
process; that is, the price paid by the new private owners for the former public firm is assumed
to be equal to its profit in the new (Cournot) equilibrium. This assumption drives the results
in favour of privatization or of asking public firms to maximize profits, since it overweights
the profits by λ in any welfare comparison.
In what follows, the next Section sets up the model. Section 3 is focused on the issue of
endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, while Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of a change
of the public firm’s objective function. Our conclusions are delegated to Section 5. All the
proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The basic setting
In a static, partial equilibrium analysis, we consider the simplest setting of a mixed duopoly,
where a private and a public firm, labelled with i = p, g respectively, produce a commodity
and compete in a quantity game. Demand preferences are described by a linear function where
intercept and slope are normalized to one:
p (qg, qp) = 1− qp − qg
Both firms are characterized by constant marginal costs, ci ≥ 0, and fixed costs, Ki ≥ 0 10.
We assume that the public firm is already in the market and its fixed cost is sunk. Conversely,
the private firm’s fixed cost is borne only in case of producing. Moreover, the private firm’s
marginal cost is normalized to zero, cp = 0, while the public firm’s one is positive, cg = c ≥ 0.
That means, c is an index of the public firm’s inefficiency.
The private firm maximizes its profit:
Πp (qg, qp) = (1− qg − qp) qp −Kp
The public firm maximize a utilitarian measure of welfare taking into account the shadow cost
of public funds, λ > 0. This parameter is a measure of the dead-weight loss due to distortionary
taxation. In particular, let S(Q) denote the consumer gross surplus, where Q = qp + qg is the
industry total output. We assume that government can choose the public firm’s output level
10We consider that the assumption of increasing returns to scale is coherent with the presence of a public
incumbent, former monopolist, in a liberalized public utility industry. Nevertheless, the assumption decreasing
return to scale is popular in the literature. For papers adopting constant marginal costs, see Cremer et al.
(1989) and Martin (2004); while for papers adopting increasing marginal costs, see Beato and Mas-Colell (1984),
de Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Matsumura (1998).
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qg and it can make a monetary transfer T to the public firm. Then, in the presence of the
shadow cost of public funds, the maximization problem of the government is:
max
qg ,T
W (qp, qg) = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp)− λT
such that Π˜g = p(qp + qg)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg + T ≥ 0 (1)
where Π˜g is the public firm’s budget including the (positive or negative) transfer T . Notice that
the (participation) constraint (1) is not a hard budget balance constraint but it is compatible
with operative losses when T is positive. From (1) we get
T = Π˜g − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
and substituting T in the objective function we obtain:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp)− λ
[
Π˜g − (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)
]
= S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) + λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)− λΠ˜g
such that Π˜g ≥ 0
Since welfare is decreasing in Π˜g when λ is positive, it is optimal to set Π˜g = 0. Then, we
have:
T = − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
The problem can be rewritten unconstrained as follows:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) + λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)
Defining the consumer net surplus as
CS(Q) = S(Q)− p(Q)(qp + qg) (2)
and the public firm’s operative profit as
Πg (qg, qp) = p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg (3)
the maximization problem of the government is reduced to:
max
qg
W (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πp (qg, qp) + (1 + λ)Πg (qg, qp) (4)
So, the objective defined in equation (4) implies that a transfer occurs in order to guarantee
the public firm’s budget balance. This transfer is positive (negative) when the public firm’s
profits are negative (positive).
The objective function (4) can be also interpreted as a weighted average of welfare, defined
as the net surplus generated in the market, and the public firm’s profit, where the former is
weighted by 1/(1 + λ), the latter by λ/(1 + λ).
W (qg, qp) = V (qg, qp) + λΠg (qg, qp) (5)
m
1
1 + λ
V (qg, qp) +
λ
1 + λ
Πg (qg, qp)
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where V (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πg (qg, qp) + Πp (qg, qp)
We know that other works on mixed oligopoly consider a weighted average of welfare as
public firm’s objective function. In fact, if we had assumed a hard budget balance constraint
without a public transfer, as in Cremer et al. (1989), the weight given to the public firm’s profit
would have been endogenous and equal to the associate Lagrangian multiplier. Alternatively,
as in Hindriks and Claude (2006) the weight could be positively related to the endogenous share
of a partially privatized firm owned by private investors, while as in Matsumura (1998), due
to incentive problem between government and public management, in equilibrium a negative
relation may occur. In the present paper the weight of the public firm’s profit is exogenously
correlated to the shadow costs of public funds. In our analysis, introducing λ extends the
contract theory approach of public monopoly regulation to the case of (mixed) oligopoly.
The best-reply (or reaction) function of the private firm is derived, as usual, from the first
order condition:
∂Πp (qg, qp)
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) + p′ (qg, qp) qp = 0
In the presence of fixed costs, the private firm’s reaction function ought to be truncated
in the point it crosses the zero-isoprofit curve and on-the-boundary solutions can occur in
equilibrium. Given the model setting, it can be written explicitly in the following way:
rp(qg) =
{
1
2 (1− qg) if qg < qg
0 if qg ≥ qg (6)
where qg = qg : Πp (rp (qg) , qg) = 0
The public firm’s first order condition can be derived from the objective (5):
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qg
=
∂V (qg, qp)
∂qg
+ λ
∂Πg (qg, qp)
∂qg
= [p (qg, qp)− c] + λ
[
p (qg, qp)− c+ p′ (qg, qp) qg
]
= 0
Notice that when λ = 0 public firm’s output decision follows the marginal cost pricing rule,
and the first term in square brackets measure its effect on total surplus (allocative effect). The
second term is the effect on the public firm’s profits, since the latter prevents the government
from using distortionary taxation to raise money (we call it the distortionary effect). When
λ→ +∞, the public firm plays as a private (Cournot) competitor.
Since there is no hard budget balance constraint and its fixed cost Kg is sunk, the public
firm’s reaction function is not truncated and it can be explicitly derived:
rg(qp) = max
{
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(1− c− qp) ; 0
}
(7)
However, we want to focus on the case in which both firms produce strictly positive quantities
when they play simultaneously; so, we provide some assumptions on the admissible set in the
parameters space.
Assumption 1 The parameters c and λ belong to the subspace
A ⊂ R× R =
{
(c, λ) |c ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
∨ λ ∈ [0, λ]}
where λ is a finite, reasonable value of the shadow cost of public funds.
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Assumption 2 The private firm’s fixed cost Kp belongs to the subspace B ⊂ R =
[
0,Kp
]
,
where Kp is smaller than the producer surplus of the private firm in any (simultaneous or
sequential) equilibrium.
In Figure 1, the reaction functions are depicted. Coherently with the Assumptions 1 and
2, the intersection occurs in the interior of the parameters space where both firms produce
strictly positive quantities.
Figure 1: Firms’ reaction functions
An increase in λ has the effect of reducing both intercept and slope of the public firm’s
best-reply. When λ tends to infinite, the public firm plays as a profit maximizer.
3 Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
In this Section we investigate how the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus
sequential (Stackelberg) games is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous decisions
by the players.11
In many mixed oligopoly and privatization works, the timing of the competition (simulta-
neous or sequential) is generally assumed, and simultaneous playing is mostly adopted.12 Of
course, this assumption is not neutral and it affects the results and the policy prescriptions
on privatization. For example, without efficiency gains, in de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is
11Notice that in formal game-theoretical terms, Stackelberg’s proposal is not to be understood as a new
solution concept for one-shot games, but rather as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game of
perfect information with exogenously given first and second movers.
12In Cremer et al. (1989, p. 284), the reason for using a simultaneous timing is summarized as follows: “The
common use of the Nash equilibrium in industrial organization [...] suggests that this is at least as plausible as
the leader-follower situations [...].”
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shown that privatization never improves welfare when a Stackelberg game with public lead-
ership is played; on the contrary, privatization may be welfare improving in the simultaneous
setting. Then, the welfare impact of privatization crucially depends on the assumed timing.
More recently, other works introduced the idea that the order of play should result from
the players’ timing decision. In particular, in a private duopoly with strategic substitutability
it has been proved by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and by Amir and Grilo (1999) that
simultaneous play emerges as the unique equilibrium of the endogenous game. Conversely, in
a mixed duopoly Pal (1998) shows that sequential play always occurs in equilibrium.
Coherently with this approach, in order to endogenize the timing of the play, we use the
game with observable delay defined by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In the first stage firms
simultaneously and independently choose the timing of action (whether to move early or late)
and then, once observing each other decision, they play the basic quantity game. The extensive
form of the game is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The extensive form of the game with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990)
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) and each player
decides the timing of action according to the outcomes in the second stage (the basic game).
Of course, none of the firms can choose the type of competition by itself, but it can only
eliminate some outcome. For example, if firm i decides to move early two outcomes are
possible according to the decision of the other player; only the Stackelberg outcome where
firm i is follower is ruled out by its decision.
Assuming existence and uniqueness of equilibria in each basic game, the following Propo-
sition summarizes the results obtained in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) for any two-player
game.
Proposition 3 Consider a two-player game for which the Nash and the two Stackelberg equi-
libria exist. Given that both players always prefer to be a Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous
player, the set of (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game is defined in the following
way:
i) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is lower than the Nash payoff for each firm, then the
unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Nash equilibrium where both firms decide
to move early;
ii) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than the Nash payoff for each firm,
then the both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the endogenous timing game;
iii) if firm i’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than its Nash payoff and if firm
j prefers to play simultaneously than to be Stackelberg follower, then the unique SPE of the
endogenous timing game is the Stackelberg equilibrium with firm j being the leader.
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Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows from Theorems II, III and IV in Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990).
The intuition behind these results is the following. Given that both firms prefer to be
leader than to play simultaneously, if the Nash payoff is higher than the follower payoff, then
any firm has a dominant strategy to move early. But if one firm prefers its follower payoff to
the Nash payoff, there is no dominant strategy: when the other player moves early it prefers
to move late and vice versa. This explains the three possible outcomes listed in Proposition
3.
We use Proposition 3 in order to determine the endogenous timing equilibrium, where the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria in each basic game are assured by Assumptions 1
and 2. The reduced form of the endogenous timing game for the mixed duopoly is represented
in Table 1.
Private Firm
Public Firm Early Late
Early WMN (.), ΠMNp (.) W
GL(.), ΠGLp (.)
Late WPL(.), ΠPLp (.) W
MN (.), ΠMNp (.)
Table 1: The reduced form of the endogenous timing game. MN, PL and GL stay for Nash,
Private Leadership and Public Leadership equilibria respectively.
In order to solve the game we need to compare the equilibrium payoffs in each basic game.
In what follows the simultaneous and sequential equilibria are derived.
3.1 Simultaneous equilibrium
When firms play simultaneously, the equilibrium output levels solve the system of the best-
reply functions (6) and (7). We refer to this equilibrium as a mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium
and the equilibrium values are labeled by MN. The output levels and the price in equilibrium
are
qMNg = (1 + λ)
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; qMNp = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
QMN = (1− c)− λ (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; pMN = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
Notice that when λ = 0, the public firm’s equilibrium output is such that the market price
is always equal to its marginal cost. It means that the public firm implements a total output
level equal to the one derived in the case of a welfare maximizer (but inefficient) monopoly;
but now the welfare is higher.13 Moreover, when the public firm is as efficient as the private
one, the first best solution is implemented.
As λ increases, the public firm equilibrium output qMNg decreases and q
MN
p increases;
then, the industry total cost decreases enhancing productive efficiency. This is because the
public firm’s concern for public transfers serves as a credible commitment to decrease its
output. Moreover, since the best-reply functions are contractions, the total output level,
13This is because the same total output is partially produced by the more efficient private competitor.
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QMN , decreases and the market price pMN increases. It is obvious that the effect on consumer
surplus is negative, raising an allocative inefficiency.14 The private firm’s profit and welfare
represent the payoffs of the players and in the simultaneous case are:
ΠMNp =
(
c+λ(1+c)
3λ+1
)2 −Kp (8)
WMN = 1−2c(1+λ)(1+2λ)
2+c2(1+λ)2(3+8λ)+2λ(3+λ(5+λ))
2(3λ+1)2
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (9)
3.2 Sequential equilibria
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the SPE of a two stage game of perfect
information in which the second mover (follower) chooses an action after having observed the
action of the first mover (leader). Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the
strategy of the second mover is a selection from its reaction function; and (ii) the first mover
chooses an action that maximizes its objective given the anticipation of the rival’s reaction.
In what follows we first analyze the case of public leadership and then the private leadership
equilibrium.
Public leadership (GL).
When the public firm moves before its private competitor, the equilibrium quantities solve
the following equation system:
qGLg = arg maxW (qg, rp(qg))
qGLp = rp(q
GL
g )
The solution is:
qGLg = max
{
(1 + 2λ)− 4c (1 + λ)
(1 + 4λ)
, 0
}
qGLp =
1
2
(
1− qGLg
)
We have to distinguish two cases since there exists a threshold value of the marginal cost
of the public firm such that ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
the public firm produces a positive quantity in
equilibrium. When c ∈
[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, the public firm prefers not to produce and the private
firm acts as a monopolist: its quantity, market price, and welfare are the same as in a private
monopoly.
Since the threshold value 1+2λ4(1+λ) is increasing, as λ increases an higher level of inefficiency
is compatible with positive production by the public firm. In Table 2 quantities, profits and
welfare in the public leadership equilibrium are summarized.
Private leadership (PL).
14There exists a clear trade off between technical and allocative efficiency, and the net effect on total surplus
is ambiguous and depends on the parameters.
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qGLp q
GL
g Π
GL
p
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
2c(1+λ)+λ
(1+4λ)
(1+2λ)−4c(1+λ)
(1+4λ)
(2c(1+λ)+λ)2
(1+4λ)2
−Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 12 0 14 −Kp
WGL
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
1
2
(4λ−2c−6cλ+4c2+λ2−4cλ2+8c2λ+4c2λ2+1)
(1+4λ) − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 38 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 2: The public leadership (GL) equilibrium quantities, profits and welfare.
qPLp q
PL
g Π
PL
p
c < λ3λ+1
1
2
(c+λ+cλ)
λ
(λ−c−3cλ)(1+λ)
2λ(1+2λ)
1
4
(c+λ+cλ)2
λ(2λ+1) −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 1− c 0 c(1− c)−Kp
WPL
c < λ3λ+1
(4λ−4cλ+4c2+8λ2+λ3−10cλ2+17c2λ−6cλ3+22c2λ2+9c2λ3)
8(2λ+1)λ − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 12 − 12c2 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 3: The private leadership (PL) equilibrium values of quantities, profits and welfare.
Assume that the private firm moves before its public competitor, that is, it behaves as
a leader in the Stackelberg game. The equilibrium quantities solve the following equation
system:
qPLp = arg max Πp (rg(qp), qp)
qPLg = rg(q
PL
p )
The solution is:
qPLp = min
{
1
2
(c+ λ+ cλ)
λ
, 1− c
}
qPLg =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
1− c− qPLp
)
As before, we have two different cases depending on the value of c. ∀c ∈
(
0, λ3λ+1
)
the
public firm produces a positive quantity in equilibrium; more precisely, it is optimal for the
private leader to choose a quantity such that the public firm’s best response is positive. When
c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
the public firm does not produce in equilibrium and the private firm plays as a
public (inefficient) monopolist: its quantity, as a limit level, is such that the market price is
equal to the marginal cost of the public firm.15 Of course total surplus is higher because the
private competitor produces more efficiently.
Moreover, as λ increases, a larger inefficiency is compatible with a positive production by
the public firm. In Table 3 quantities, profits and welfare in the private leadership equilibrium
are summarized.
15This is the standard case when λ = 0: the public follower can always produce the quantity needed to achieve
this target and, anticipating this strategy, the best action for the private firm is to produce that quantity.
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3.3 Endogenous timing equilibria
In this section we derive the endogenous timing equilibria of the mixed duopoly game. In
order to apply Proposition 3 we need to rank the private and public firms’ payoff in the
different equilibria. In particular, in Lemma 4 we compare the private firm’s profit under
public leadership (i.e., the follower payoff) and in the Nash equilibrium, while in Lemma 5 we
compare welfare under private leadership (again the follower payoff) with the one in the Nash
equilibrium. It is worth noting that these comparisons are sufficient to apply Proposition 3.
In fact, any player always prefers to be leader than to play simultaneously, by the nature of
Stackelberg equilibria. Moreover, the comparison between the leader and the follower payoff
is useless since no firm can unilaterally switch from one sequential equilibrium to the other.
Lemma 4 There exists a subspace F1 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the private firm strictly prefers
the public leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace F̂1 =
A− F1 the reverse is true.
This result totally relies on the choice of the public leader to produce more or less than
in the simultaneous equilibrium; and this choice depends on the public firm’s objective being
increasing or decreasing in the rival’s output in the Nash equilibrium point.
In fact, private firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the public firm’s output in any in-
terior point16, and so, if qPLg < q
MN
g , the private firm prefers to be follower than to play
simultaneously.
The public leader chooses to produce a smaller quantity with respect to the Nash equi-
librium if ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp > 0 in the Nash equilibrium. In fact, if its objective is increasing in the
quantity produced by the rival, the public leader prefers to reduce its quantity anticipating
that the private firm will increase the output, enhancing in this way the welfare.17
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
=
∂V
∂qp
+ λ
∂Πg
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) + λp′ (qg, qp) qg = p (qg, qp)− λqg
In the Nash equilibrium:
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
∣∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
= c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
− λ (1 + λ) (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
=
c
(
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
)− λ2
(3λ+ 1)
Then, ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp
∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
> 0 if c > λ
2
2λ2+3λ+1
.
This result occurs when the increase in productive efficiency due to the shift of some
production to the private firms outweighs the negative allocative efficiency effect due to the
reduction in total quantity and the negative distortionary effect due to the reduction in profits.
The threshold c (λ) is increasing because, as λ increases, the distortionary effect makes the
public firm more willing to produce a larger quantity. So, only if c is high enough the overall
effect of shifting some production to the efficient private competitor is positive.
16Indeed, ∂Πp (qg, qp) /∂qg = p
′ (qg, qp) qp < 0 ∀qp > 0.
17Note that welfare increases despite the total quantity reduction.
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Lemma 5 There exists a subspace F2 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the public firm strictly prefers
the private leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace
F̂2 = A− F2 the reverse is true.
As in the previous Lemma, this result has to do with the fact that W (qg, qp) may be
increasing in qp. But now what matters is the decision of the private leader, that always
increases its output with respect to the Nash equilibrium. As a result, total output increases
and the allocative efficiency effect is positive. Recalling that moving from Nash to the public
leadership equilibrium had a negative allocative efficiency effect, we would expect that the
parameter space F2 is larger F1. This intuition is confirmed by the comparison of the thresholds
c (λ) and c (λ). In fact,
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
<
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
= c (λ) ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Then, F1 ⊂ F2.
In the following Theorem the different SPE of the endogenous timing game are derived.
Theorem 6 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. The
SPE of the endogenous timing game are defined in the following way:
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game;
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 ∩ F2, the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the private firm acting as leader;
c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1, both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous
timing game.
Figure 3 depicts the three possible outcomes of the endogenous timing game in the space
(c, λ). Without considering λ, the previous literature (Pal, 1998) defines a unique solution
where both sequential equilibria are SPE. The novel contribution of our analysis is to enlarge
the set of possible outcomes defining conditions under which either private leadership or Nash
equilibrium may arise as the unique SPE. The intuition is straightforward. Since the public
firm’s objective function is a weighted average of total surplus and profits, for low values of
λ (given c) our result coincides with Pal’s; for high values of λ (given c), the public firm
mimics the private firm’s behaviour and we obtain the same results as Amir and Grilo (1999)
in a private duopoly. For intermediate values of λ, private leadership is the unique SPE since
the public firm is more willing to accept a reduction in its own output when total quantity
increases (in the PL equilibrium) than when total output decreases (in the GL equilibrium).
Moreover, when we focus on the sequential outcomes, the introduction of λ increases the
level of inefficiency compatible with a strictly positive quantity produced by the public firm
in equilibrium. In particular, in the private leadership case, Pal (1998) shows that the public
firm never produces and its presence has a mere strategical role that induces the competitor to
produce the limit quantity. In our framework, taking into account the shadow cost of public
funds, the public firm usually produces a positive quantity in equilibrium.18
18This is true as far as the public firm is not too inefficient. This result enhances the realism of our approach
where the public firm represents not only a threat of producing, but it has an active role in the industry.
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Figure 3: SPE of the endogenous timing game in the space of parameters (c, λ)
3.4 Equilibrium selection
In the subspace F1 the endogenous timing game of the mixed duopoly has two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. Then, this is a standard coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium. We now analyze the pure-strategy equilibrium
selection problem according to the risk dominance criterion developed by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988).19 Applied to coordination games with two pure-strategy equilibria, this procedure
picks the equilibrium that has the largest basin of attraction in the initial beliefs of the players
on each other’s behaviour. In other words, it minimizes the risk of a coordination failure due
to the strategic uncertainty that players face in a coordination game (Amir and Stepanova,
2006). This criterion proved to be a powerful selection concept in experimental settings of
coordination games (Cooper et al., 1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990) and in evolutionary games
characterized by experimentation and myopic learning (Ellison, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993). It
is shown that the risk dominant equilibrium is often selected even when it is Pareto dominated
by another equilibrium. One equilibrium risk-dominates the other if it is associated with the
larger product of deviation losses. In our framework this means that private leadership is
selected using the risk-dominance criterion if(
WPL −WMN) (ΠPLp −ΠMNp ) > (WGL −WMN) (WGL −ΠMNp ) (10)
Theorem 7 The private leadership equilibrium risk-dominates the public leadership equilib-
rium ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F1.
Then, the risk dominance criterion selects in the whole set F1 the same equilibrium that
the Pareto dominance criterion is able to select only in a subspace of F1. It is important
19In the present setting it is possible to show that the standard refinements of Nash equilibrium for normal
form games – perfection, properness and strategic stability – cannot be invoked to rule out one of the pure
strategy SPE.
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to highlight that the risk-dominance criterion is applied to the reduced game, and not to
the entire two-stage game of endogenous timing, and the two options are a priori entirely
different. However, since each subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium and given the use of
subgame perfection in this framework, our application of the risk-dominance criterion on the
reduced game seems to us rather natural.20 Amir and Stepanova (2006) suggest the following
interpretation: the private leadership equilibrium is chosen by firms that wish to minimize the
risk of coordination failure in their timing decisions.
The preference for the private leadership equilibrium is the main contribution in Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984), where it is assumed that the public firm is committed to a decision
rule (in their case the marginal-cost pricing rule), and the private firm maximizes its own
profit given the decision rule of the public competitor. In the present setting, using the
game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) coupled with risk dominance as a
selection criterion, we show that the private leadership equilibrium emerges as the endogenous
equilibrium in the mixed duopoly ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2.
4 Welfare effect of profit-maximizer public firm
In this Section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to analyze the effects of
asking the public firm to directly maximize profits21 on welfare taking into account the result
of the previous Section on the endogenous timing equilibrium.
By a change in the public firm’s objective function we consider the case in which its
management is instructed to maximize profits:
Πg (qg, qp) = [p (qg, qp)− c] qg
This change in the objective function might have the complementary effect of enhancing the
productive efficiency of the public firm. This can happens since it is easier to measure profits
than to measure welfare and with the new targets public management can be monitored and
motivated in its performance. We consider the two extreme cases in which either no efficiency
gain or full efficiency are achieved. In the first case, the public firm that maximize profits
retains the same technology as before; in the latter, it is able to produce at the same marginal
cost of its competitor, here normalized to zero. After the objective function change, the new
reaction function of firm g is:
rg(qp) = max
{
1
2
(1− c− qp) , 0
}
(11)
with c = 0 in the case of full efficiency gains. Comparing the reaction function before (7) and
after the objective function change, it is easy to see that it becomes steeper. Indeed:
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
>
1
2
∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
and only when λ→∞ the slope of (7) converges to (6).
20See van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) for the application of the risk-
dominance criterion on the reduced game of endogenous timing models in price game duopolies.
21As private and privatized firm do.
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Absent efficiency gains, also the intercept. With full efficiency gains the intercept increases
only when c > 12(1+λ) .
The change in the reaction function is not the only effect of asking the pubic firm to
maximize profits. In fact, we have to consider the (possible) change in the endogenous timing
equilibrium. In order to derive the SPE of the game after the change, we can rely on the
results in Amir and Grilo (1999) that apply the same endogenous timing structure to a private
duopoly. The following Proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 8 Consider a private duopoly quantity game with strategic substitutes. When
the values of the parameters are in the admissible set A, the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move early.
Proof of Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 no Nash equilibrium lies on the
boundary, i.e. no firm produces zero output. In this case we can apply Theorem 2.2 in
Amir and Grilo (1999) that proves that both firms prefer always to be simultaneous player
than Stackelberg follower. So, according to point i) Proposition 3, the unique SPE of the
endogenous timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is clear. Since the firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the
rival’s output, a private leader always increases its own quantity in comparison with the
Cournot-Nash quantity. By the same reason, a private follower is always strictly worse off
with respect to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, sequential play is only sustainable in a
mixed duopoly.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the solution of the system of equations (6) and (11).
Quantities and price are:22
qCNg =
1− 2c
3
; qCNp =
1 + c
3
QCN =
2− c
3
; pCN =
1 + c
3
The (domestic) total surplus and the public firm’s profit are:
V CN =
8− 8c+ 11c2
18
−Kg −Kp; ΠCNg =
(
1− 2c
3
)2
Recall that in the case of achieving full efficiency c = 0. Of course, in order to compare welfare
before and after the change in the public firm’s objective function, public firm profits matter.
When profits increase of 1 Euro, the measure of welfare increase of 1+λ Euros.23 In this case,
total welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is:
WCN =
1
18
(
2λ+ 11c2 + 8− 8c (1 + λ− cλ))− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (12)
22Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
23If we extend our analysis to privatization, in order to compare welfare before and after privatization, the
price paid to the government for buying the firm matters. In fact, since we are taking into account the shadow
cost of public funds, it is not indifferent whether profits are public or private, and if the government is able
to raise enough money from privatization. Given the equilibrium after privatization, the more money the
government is able to raise by selling the public firm, the higher the welfare after the privatization. In the first
instance, we give full bargaining power to the government; i.e., it is able to extract the whole profit from the
privatized firm. In this case, total welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the same computed considering
that public firm maximizes profits, without privatization.
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The following theorem states the result of the comparison when no efficiency gain occurs.
Theorem 9 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. In
addition, assume that by changing the objective function of the public firm no efficiency gains
are achieved. Then, maximizing profits instead of maximize welfare always reduces welfare.
This result is in sharp contrast with those obtained assuming simultaneous playing. For
example, de Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that assuming Cournot competition privatiza-
tion24 may enhance welfare absent efficiency gains.25 The same result holds in the framework
of the present paper. Disregarding the endogenous timing game, and comparing WMN from
equation (9) and WCN from equation (12) ∀ (c, λ) ∈ A, maximizin profits (or privatization)
may increase welfare. More precisely, it occurs when
c > 4λ+6λ
2+1
26λ+12λ2+8
Now, we move the analysis to the other extreme case: full efficiency. The following Theorem
formalizes the result.
Theorem 10 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. In
addition, assume that by changing the objective function of the public firm full efficiency gains
are achieved. Then, there exists a subset of the parameter J ⊂ A, such that asking the public
firm to maximize profits reduces welfare.
In Figure 4 we graph the set J in the parameters’ space in the case of welfare is reduced by
the change of the public firm’s objective function even if we assume to achieve full efficiency.
Endogenizing the timing of competition, before and after the change of the public firm’ ob-
jective function, enlarges this space with respect to the simultaneous case. In fact, it is easy
to show that, assuming simultaneous competition, welfare has been reduced if
c <
3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
It is interesting to notice that the level of c such that public ownership is the dominant solution
in terms of welfare is decreasing in λ. This occurs because, as λ increases, the profit motivation
has a larger weight in the public firm’s decision.
If we extend our analysis to privatization we can notice that the allocative efficiency effect
of the public ownership decreases and the productive efficiency effect of privatization becomes
more and more important. Thus, we can say that the more the public firm behaves as a profit
maximizer, the better is to privatize it. This result is obtained assuming that the government
is able to extract the whole profit from the new owners of the privatized firm. Suppose now
that the government is able to take just half of the profit. How the previous result are affected?
In Figure 4 we can see how the space of the parameters such that the privatization reduces
welfare is enlarged. The dashed line delimits the space of a welfare-reducing full efficient
privatization when the government sells the public firm at a price equal to half of the future
profits. An extreme result occurs when the firm is sold for free. In this latter case, a full
efficient privatization always lowers welfare.
24Recall that under our model setting, privatization and profit maximization are equivalent in terms of market
performance.
25This result is obtained in a different setting with symmetric firms and increasing marginal costs.
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Figure 4: The welfare effect of a full efficient privatization: in gray the space of the parameters
in (c, λ) in which privatization reduces welfare when the government extracts all the profits
from the privatized firm
5 Conclusions
The aim of the present work is to characterize the equilibrium and analyze the effect of asking
to a public firm to maximize profits in a mixed duopoly where an (inefficient) public firm
competes in the quantities with a domestic private one.
We do not assume the timing of competition a priori. Rather, we endogenize the deter-
mination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games by applying
the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s model to this mixed duopoly framework.
Since we mainly refer to public utility markets open to competition, we assume that firms’
production is characterized by increasing return to scale, with fixed cost and constant marginal
cost. In this framework, we define the objective function of the public firm assuming that its
management is instructed to maximize welfare taking into account the shadow cost of public
funds. As the following citation suggests, this approach has been generally used to characterize
public monopolies running a deficit.
[M]any public enterprises are natural monopolies, i.e. firms that exhibit increas-
ing returns to scale. Once it has been proved desirable to run such an enterprise
at all, its product should be priced at marginal cost provided the resulting deficit
can be financed through lump-sum taxes. If there are not lump-sum, discrepancies
between consumer and producer taxes will result in inefficiencies in the rest of
the economy. (...) This has been taken as an argument for requiring the public
enterprise to cover, by its own means, at least part of its deficit. (Marchand et al.,
1984)
We believe that extending this approach to the mixed duopoly framework is rather natural
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and fills, at least partially, some gaps of the previous literature. Indeed, discussing the results
of their paper, Beato and Mas-Colell (1984, p. 82) state:
Finally, the limitations of this paper and the need for further work should be
clear. We have, for example, ruled out both fixed cost and the general equilibrium
effects of distortions in other markets. We don’t know if reasonable versions of the
main results of this paper [...] are available in these richer settings.
The extensive process of privatization started in the eighties of the last century and still in
place nowadays is essentially driven by the belief that private discipline and profit motivation
can enhance efficiency. Moreover, privatization is also considered as a powerful instrument
to raise money to reduce distortionary taxation. In this work we contrast the general extent
of these ideas. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare,
and that an inefficient public firm may be preferred even when large efficiency gains could be
realized by privatization. These results are obtained assuming that both public firm’s profits
and privatization proceeds are substitute for distortionary taxation. The endogenous timing
model applied to the mixed oligopoly framework is not less important for our results. While
after privatization only the simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium can be implemented,
with a public firm sequential equilibria – that are always welfare superior – may be sustained as
SPE of the endogenous timing game. Therefore, privatization changes not only the ownership
and the objective function of the public firm, but also the type of competition in the market.
Finally, the assumption of larger marginal cost for the public firm deserves a last comment.
In our model we follow the general presumption that public ownership is relatively inefficient
when compared to private ownership. This has been justified by the theory of incentives
that has been used to demonstrate that agency problems in state-owned enterprises can cause
larger inefficiencies than in private-owned firms. But we are aware that from an empirical
point of view the picture is quite mixed and the variance of the results substantial (Cuervo
and Villalonga, 2000).26 However, any relaxation of our assumption obviously strengthen the
results obtained in this paper.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. Comparing the equilibrium profits ΠGLp in Table 2 with Π
MN
p in
equation (8), it easy to check that ∀λ ≥ 0:
(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0.
26See for example the reviews of Megginson and Netter (2001) and Willner (2001) that report the results
of hundreds of empirical papers on privatization and on the comparison of private and public ownership, and
Newbery (2000, chapter 3) that summarizes empirical findings on the technical and economic efficiency of
private and public firms in utility markets.
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(ii) ∀c ∈
[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 always.
Thus, we define the subspace F1 and F̂1 as follows:
F1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)} (13)
Proof of Lemma 5. Comparing the welfare level WPL in Table 3 with WMN in equation
(9), it easy to check that ∀λ ∈ (λ):27
(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, λ3λ+1
)
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0
(ii) ∀c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
,
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Thus, we define the subspace F2 and F̂2 as follows:
F2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)} (14)
Proof of Theorem 6.
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to the
public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈ F̂2 the public firm is better off in the Nash
equilibrium than in the private leadership equilibrium. Therefore, in the intersection
space F̂1 ∩ F̂2, no firm wants to be follower. Since ∀λ ∈
(
0, λ
)
, c (λ) < c (λ), it follows
that F̂2 ⊂ F̂1; then F̂1 ∩ F̂2 coincides with F̂2. Given that each player always prefers to
be the Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous player, point i) of Proposition 3 applies
and the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing
game.
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to the
public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public firm is better off in the
private leadership equilibrium than in the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. So, point
iii) of Proposition 3 applies and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm acting
as leader is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
27The threshold c < λ
3λ+1
∀λ < 5.37228. Since λ is a measure of the distortion by taxation, we are comfortable
assuming that λ is lower than 5.37228. If λ ≥ 5.37228 we would have that WPL < WMN always.
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c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1 the private firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower than to play
simultaneously. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower
than to play simultaneously. Since∀λ > 0, c (λ) < c (λ), it follows that F1 ⊂ F2; then
F1 ∩ F2 coincides with F1. So, point ii) of Proposition 3 applies and both Stackelberg
equilibria belong to the set of the (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Theorem 7. In order to prove the result we need to consider three cases depending
on the fact that boundary solutions may occur in the two sequential equilibria. By comparing
the thresholds defined in Section 3.2, we have the following equilibria:
(i) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c < λ1+3λ , both Stackelberg equilibria are interior. Then, the values
of WGL, ΠGLp , W
PLand ΠPLp of interest are those in the first row of Tables 2 and 3.
(ii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and λ1+3λ < c < 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not produce in the pri-
vate leadership equilibrium while it produces positive quantity in the public leadership
equilibrium. Then, the values of WGL and ΠGLp of interest are are those in the first row
of Table 2, while for WPLand ΠPLp we have to consider the values in the second row of
Table 3.
(iii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c > 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not produce in both Stackelberg
equilibria. Then, the values of WGL, ΠGLp , W
PLand ΠPLp of interest are those in the
second row of Tables 2 and 3.
Applying the criterion (10), straightforward but tedious computations show the result.
Proof of Theorem 9. In order to prove the result, we need to consider three cases: (i)
Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly; (ii) private leadership is the relevant
equilibrium of the mixed duopoly with an interior solution;and (iii) private leadership with
the public firm not producing is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly.
(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game
when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to compare WMN , defined in equation (9) with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WMN > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the Stackelberg outcome with the
private firm as leader is the relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F2.
Moreover, when c < λ3λ+1 the public firm produces positive quantity in the equilibrium.
Then, we have to compare the value of WPL in the first row of Table 3 with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c < λ3λ+ 1
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(iii) When c ≥ λ3λ+1 , the public firm does not produce in the private leadership equilibrium.
Thus, we have to compare the value of WPL in the second row of Table 3 with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c > λ3λ+ 1
Proof of Theorem 10. When the privatized firm achieves full efficiency gains, welfare after
privatization is:
WCN
∣∣
c=0
=
4 + λ
9
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (15)
In order to prove the result we have to distinguish between three cases as in Theorem 9.
(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game
when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to compare WMN , defined in equation (9) with WCN
(equation 15). Straightforward computations show that
WMN ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, c < 3(1+2λ)
2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
Thus, we can define the subset
J1 =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F̂2
∣∣∣ c < 3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)√2(3+8λ(1+λ))3(1+λ)(3+8λ) }
Referring to the definition of the subset F̂2 in (14), it is easy to check that J1 is a
nonempty set.
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the private leadership equilibrium is the
relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F2. Moreover, when c < λ3λ+1
the public firm produces positive quantity in the equilibrium. Then, we have to compare
the value of WPL in the first row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 15). First of all, define
F2a =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c < λ3λ+ 1
}
Straightforward computations show that:
WPL ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2a, 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ)− 18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0
Thus we can define the subset
J2a =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2a| 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ)− 18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0
}
that is nonempty.
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(iii) Defining
F2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c ≥ λ3λ+ 1
}
the public firm does not produce in the private leadership equilibrium. Then, we have
to compare the value of WPL in the second row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 15).
Straightforward computations show that the subset J2b ⊂ F2b such that privatization
reduces welfare is not empty.
J2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2b|c < 13
√
1− 2λ⇔WPrL −WFE ≥ 0
}
Then, the subset of parameters’ values such that a full efficient privatization with full
bargaining power to the government reduces welfare is the following:
J = J1 ∪ J2a ∪ J2b
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